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Abstract:  
The process of choosing the exchange rate regime for the new EU member states 
has been influenced by other criteria than the traditional ones, which belong to 
macroeconomic criteria. This paper make a comparative analyze of the exchange rate 
arrangements in Central and Eastern European after 1990. These arrangements are 
dynamic on the one hand due to their permanent diversification and on the other hand 
because the values established this way are rapidly changing. In essence, they differ 
according to the degree of flexibility adopted when the exchange rate is established: from 
more rigid forms – currency board or pegging the currency to a foreign currency – to free 
floating.  
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Exchange rate arrangements vary according to the degree of flexibility in 
establishing the exchange rate: from more rigid forms – currency board or pegging 
domestic currency to another unit – to free floating.  
While the literature in the field of optimum currency area provides the framework for 
choosing a certain currency regime, at the present time a new concept is emerging in the 
specialized literature, namely that of “fear of floating” (Calvo, G., Reinhart, C., 2002). Its 
definition starts from the presupposition that highly volatile exchange rates decrease trade 
output, increase the interest rate risk premium and reduce welfare. While “de jure” they are 
floating exchange rates, “de facto” these rates imply high risks, revealed by the financial 
crises emerging countries have had to face.  
“The fear of floating” can be explained starting from the following facts: 
− The variability of the exchange rate is one of the prominent features of an open 
economy and the tendency of the nominal exchange rate to move in a volatile and 
unpredictable way has been blamed for the decrease in trade output and welfare. The 
wish to moderate this volatility is the motivation for controlled or fixed currency regimes 
in certain countries. The question that rises is whether a certain currency arrangement 
has a significant impact upon trade or not. The answer is not very obvious, empirical 
evidence pointing to both directions. However, there is a unanimous opinion that a 
stable exchange rate promotes trade, especially that of the monetary union (Rose, A. 
K., 2000). That is the reason why it is said that the fixed exchange rate helps emerging 
economies to promote the increase in investments and savings.  
− Most developing countries cannot obtain loans in their own currency from abroad, their 
debt being denominated in a foreign currency. That is why the depreciation of the 
domestic currency entails huge pressure on the balance of payments.  
The fixed and the flexible exchange rates are two alternatives that in fact are the 
extremes. There are several hybrid systems between them: controlled or dirty floating, 
when central banks sometimes intervene in the market; wider band floating, a compromise 
reached after 1971 when the members of the International Monetary Fund decided to 
enlarge the floating band to ±2.25% by the Smithsonian Agreement on the realignment of 
major currencies; temporary exchange rate stability, with changes imposed by market 
requirements (the crawling peg), case in which the fixed rate is adjusted periodically 
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according to the evolution of certain quantitative indicators monitored in a particular 
country.  
After a certain period of considerable volatility of exchange rates, implying 
substantial US dollar appreciation in comparison to the 80s, a compromise was reached 
by the Louvre Agreement (1987), which set specific target zones for the major currencies, 
and marked the transition from flexible to controlled exchange rates. This followed the 
Plaza Agreement (1985) in which the US agreed on the necessity of intervening in 
currency markets during periods of instability, this intervention being possible only with the 
cooperation between monetary authorities (Levi, M., 2005).  
The international monetary system shaped by the Louvre Agreement may be 
considered a flexible exchange rate system, within targets revised periodically, but in 
which the interference level is not clearly stated. The engagement of monetary authorities 
by setting a plausible target for all currency markets participants can help maintaining 
exchange rates within a stated target even without intervention on the market (Krugman, 
P., 1991).  
Currency arrangements of the free floating type yield better results in developed 
economies, without creating inflationist pressure. The advantages of flexible exchange 
rates increase if that particular country integrates into the global capital market and 
develops a vigorous financial system (Rogoff, K., Husain, A., Mody, A., Brooks, R., 
Oomes, N., 2003). In economies such as that of the US, Japan or Western Europe, free 
floating is appropriate as financial markets are developed and the economic system is 
flexible (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2004). 
Capital mobility is a prerequisite of exchange rate flexibility, as banks and 
companies need specific financial instruments to resist the volatility of international prices 
(Eichengreen, B., Razo-Garcia, R., 2005). 
However, the liberalization of the capital account is possible only when institutional, 
legislative and macroeconomic reforms are instituted to support development of financial 
markets. The way to ensuring exchange rate flexibility must be parallel to that concerning 
the deregulation and liberalization of capital markets. 
Developing economies have a limited capacity of absorbing large exchange rate 
fluctuations due to poor development of markets for protecting the currency (Reinhart, C., 
Rogoff, K., 2002). These countries, with limited access to external capital markets have 
two options: either currency arrangements that limit flexibility (fixed exchange rates or 
managed floating), or free floating accompanied by an inflation-targeting monetary strategy 
(Fischer, S., 2001 and Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995). Fixed exchange rates are not 
feasible in emerging economies because, under such circumstances, regional monetary 
unions are impossible, and unilateral pegging of domestic currency causes losing control 
over the monetary policy.  
 The process of choosing the exchange rate regime for the new EU member states 
has been influenced by other criteria than the traditional ones, which belong to 
macroeconomic criteria. During the last few years, these countries have suffered 
significant economic and politic mutations, as the first stage of transition included 
liberalization of prices and trade, and in the second half of the 90s, remarkable progress 
was made with respect to disinflation.  Economic growth and liberalization of the capital 
account have attracted foreign investments. Economic development has been 
accompanied by political and social pressure. Under such circumstances, many countries 
have had to resist speculative attacks against their domestic currencies (the Czech 
Republic in 1997 and Slovakia in 1998).  
 Exchange rates regimes in Central and Eastern European countries are analyzed 
according to their stages of development – stabilization, transition, preparation for the 
Eurozone –, namely:  
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1. In the early 90s, “pegging” the domestic currency to another one was the most 
common option, through conventional arrangements in which the exchange rate could 
fluctuate by ±1% of the established rate or be maintained within the limits of a wider 
fluctuation band. The choice was based on the wish to utilize the exchange rate as 
nominal anchor during the macroeconomic stabilization period. The Czech Republic 
and Slovakia continued even after 1993 to peg their domestic currencies to a basket of 
currencies consisting of the US dollar and the Deutsche mark. Hungary as well pegged 
its domestic currency to a basket of currencies consisting of a the US dollar and the 
Deutsche  mark in order to maintain a stable exchange rate for a certain period, with 
changes imposed by market requirements. After a period of fixed rates, Poland 
officially introduced in 1991 the “pegging” regime, anchoring its domestic currency to a 
basket of currencies consisting of the US dollar and the Deutsche mark. Estonia 
introduced the currency board in 1992 on the Deutsche mark. Initially, Latvia and 
Lithuania adopted flexible regimes (managed floating) but after 1994, they took on 
“pegging” regimes, Lithuania adopting the US dollar currency board. Bulgaria, Slovenia 
and Romania adopted flexible regimes, despite their high inflation rates. This was due 
to their low foreign currency reserves in the early 90s, approximately 1/5 of the 
reserves of Poland and Hungary, fact that made “pegging” very difficult.  
2. Starting with the late 90s, there was a new trend: countries moved towards either 
flexible regimes or the very rigid ones. General progress in economic stabilization, 
including economic growth, substantial deflation, and the liberalization of the capital 
account attracted significant capital flows. In some countries, especially in those with 
fixed exchange rates (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia), these capital 
inflows required wide-scale and expensive interventions. Consequently, some 
countries started to turn towards more flexible currency regimes, while others – such as 
the Baltic States and Poland – stuck to their fixed or intermediate regimes. Lithuania, 
Estonia and Bulgaria settled on a tight peg to euro through currency boards. Latvia 
pegged its currency to the DST until January 1, 2005 and then to the euro, Hungary 
adopted in 2001 a regime comparable to the ERM II and Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania use floating regimes.  
3. Relatively recent changes in monetary policies in new EU member states have been 
induced by the need to align to institutional requirements imposed by the euro area.  
In the present, several empiric studies have proved that the evaluation of central 
parities adjustments and interventions on exchange markets could induce currency 
regimes that differ from official arrangements. First of all, a country can experience low 
fluctuations of the exchange rate although monetary authorities do not have an official 
commitment to maintain the parity between specific limits. This behavior is commonly 
compared to the fear of floating phenomenon (Calvo, G., Reinhart, C., 2002). Secondly, a 
country can disclose its fear of pegging when, trying to maintain a pegged rate, 
experiences in fact parity changes (Levy-Yeyati, E., Sturzenger, F., 2001).  
The (official) “de jure” classification is made by the IMF and the “de facto” 
classification is based upon procedures developed by Reinhart and Rogoff. The 
differences between “de facto” and “de jure” exchange rates appear at the beginning of 
transition period, when several countries announced more rigid exchange rates than the 
ones they used. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary announced “pegging” 
regimes, but in effect, they used intermediate or floating regimes. After the “de jure” 
classification, Poland had an intermediate regime, but in reality, the Polish zloty was 
floating. This phenomenon appeared when by using fixed exchange rates, several 
countries had to face situations that required a high degree of flexibility. However, central 
banks did not enjoy then enough credibility so as to adopt flexible currency regimes. 
During the stabilization period, the floating regime was more frequent in reality suggesting 
a “fear of floating”. Slovenia had a different approach. Because of “fear of floating”, 
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Slovenia announced that the domestic currency was floating, while the monetary authority 
was recurrently intervening on the currency market. This approach was due to the fact that 
Slovenia did not have a sufficient foreign currency reserve.   
 Today’s currency arrangements in Central and Eastern European countries are 
dynamic on the one hand due to their permanent diversification and on the other hand 
because the values established this way are rapidly changing.  
 
Table 1. Currency Arrangements and Monetary Policy Strategies in new EU member 
states (2007) 
 
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Strategy 
Bulgaria Currency board – the euro Exchange rate targeting 
Czech Republic Managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the 
exchange rate, reference 
currency: the euro 
Direct inflation targeting 
Cyprus  Pegged exchange rates within 
fluctuation bands (±15%) – 
ERM II (May 2005) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Estonia  Currency board – the euro – 
ERM II (June 2004) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Hungary Pegged exchange rates within 
fluctuation bands (±15%) 
Direct inflation targeting + 
Exchange rate targeting 
Latvia  Fixed pegging to the euro - 
ERM II (May 2005) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Lithuania Currency board – the euro – 
ERM II (June 2004) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Malta Fixed pegging to the euro - 
ERM II (May 2005) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Poland Free floating Direct inflation targeting 
Romania Managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the 
exchange rate,  reference 
currency: the euro 
Direct inflation targeting 
Slovakia  Pegged exchange rates within 
fluctuation bands (±15%) – 
ERM II (November 2005) 
Direct inflation targeting + 
Exchange rate targeting 
Slovenia Pegged exchange rates within 
unspecified fluctuation bands 
– ERM II (June 2004); 
euro (January 2007) 
Exchange rate targeting 
Source: IMF - “Annual Report”, April 2006; IMF - “Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrict”, 2006 
 
The analysis of currency arrangements reveals the fact that a domestic currency 
has a “fixed exchange rate” “pegged” to another currency – the euro –, which, in its turn, 
has a free floating arrangement. The variation of the reference currency is added to the 
internal factors specific to the respective country, which influence the exchange rate of the 
domestic currency with reference to the foreign currency, through these “fixed”, in fact 
“pegged”, definitions.  
Due to these facts, with respect to the exchange rate regimes, the component of the 
monetary policy promoted by a certain country has become more important than it used to 
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be in the past when there was a common denominator, such as gold for example. As a 
neutral or quasi-neutral monetary asset, gold did not belong to an “issuing” country from 
which to take up and store the economic, financial or political context, as it happens today 
through “pegging”, “fixing” or “defining” with reference to a foreign currency.  
From one stage to another, every country establishes its monetary policy objective 
in correlation to the variation of the domestic currency exchange rate. Primarily, the 
monetary policy strategy is established according to the targets or the anchor to which it 
is “pegged” in order to ensure stability:  
• Exchange rate targeting. This phrase expresses the priority to maintain the level or to 
target a certain level of the exchange rate. The monetary authority intervenes in the 
market by selling/buying foreign currencies at a certain rate in order to maintain the 
exchange rate within the preannounced limits or at a certain level. In this latter case, 
the foreign exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor or intermediate target of the 
monetary policy. This strategy is present in those currency arrangements systems that 
do not have a distinct legal means of payment or in currency board arrangements, fixed 
peg arrangements, pegged exchange rates that fluctuate between bands. 
• Monetary aggregates targeting. In this case, the monetary authority uses its 
instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate (M1, M2, M3 and 
L), and the targeted aggregate becomes the nominal anchor or intermediate target of 
monetary policy; in addition, the monetary authority also aims at ensuring a stability of 
the exchange rate. 
• Direct inflation targeting. It is usually employed in countries with high inflation rates, 
being associated with inflation reduction by setting certain numerically defined targets; 
in general, the target is to reduce a three-figure inflation rate to a two-figure and then 
one-figure inflation rate. This involves several steps to be taken with an institutional 
commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets. Monetary policy 
decisions are guided by the deviation of forecasts of future inflation from the 
announced target, with the inflation forecast acting (implicitly or explicitly) as the 
intermediate anchor of monetary policy. Direct inflation targeting was officially 
introduced in the Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1999), Hungary (2001), Slovenia 
(2002) and Romania (2005), moment that coincided with the official orientation towards 
flexible currency arrangements.  
Many specialists consider that direct inflation targeting offers the EU new member 
countries a viable monetary policy choice that facilitates both economic transition and the 
monetary convergence to the Eurozone. The analysis implies that the monetary 
convergence begins with flexible inflation targeting and concludes with a full-fledged 
euroization (Orlowski, L., 2005). 
The present-day types of currency arrangements existent in the region, 
according to the information each country has transmitted to the IMF, are presented below.  
1. Currency board arrangements. This category comprises those countries whose 
domestic currency is defined by their monetary legislation, as a legal payment method, but 
the rate of exchange is regulated by a legal document that establishes the following: 
− Exchanging the domestic currency to a certain foreign monetary unit is to be made by a 
fixed rate; 
− The currency issue can be restricted depending on the degree to which the central 
bank meets the requirements of the arrangement. In essence, this is about controlling 
the monetary mass, reducing inflation and stabilizing the exchange rate of the domestic 
currency.  
The provisions of such an arrangement require that the domestic currency issue be 
made only against foreign currency and the entire internal monetary mass be supported by 
external assets: for example, the currency issue can take place only when a particular 
country has a surplus of the balance of payments, which in monetary terms means foreign 
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currency inflows. Therefore, the central bank loses its “traditional” functions, such as 
monetary control and “lender-of-last-resort.” These functions are entrusted to a currency 
board, which in fact can be an entity within the central bank and which takes on some of 
the central bank’s functions provisionally, until monetary recovery.  
The foreign currency to which the domestic currency is pegged is established by 
arrangement (as foreign currency inflows or external assets). In the case of the analyzed 
countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania – the reference foreign currency is the euro.  
Beginning with 1999, Bulgaria has a currency board through which the Lev is 
pegged to the euro by a fixed rate of 1 EUR = 1.95583 BGN. Since June 2004, Estonia 
and Lithuania participate to the Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM II, without modifying 
the currency board provisions on the euro: Estonian crown at 1 EUR = 15.6466 EEK and 
the Lithuanian litas at 1 EUR = 3.45280 LTL.   
The fixed rate, the amount of foreign currency reserve and the size of the monetary 
mass, depending on the connection established, define the dominant currency in which the 
international payments and cashing are made in these countries; in the above examples, 
the dominant currency is the euro.  
2. Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements. This class comprises those countries 
whose domestic currency is formally pegged at a fixed rate to the euro: Latvia and Malta. 
In this type of currency arrangement, countries are not required to maintain irreversibly the 
established parity. The rate of exchange may fluctuate between certain limits from the 
established central rate (for example, by ±1%) or certain minimum or maximum variation 
limits are established as margins of, usually, ±2%. Irrespective of its option, the monetary 
authority intends to enforce the observation of a fixed parity through direct interventions on 
the money market, buying and selling domestic currency for the foreign currency to which 
it is pegged (intervention currency). Fixed parity may also be enforced through indirect 
interventions, through a firm policy of the rate of exchange, by restrictive currency regime 
regulations, or through interventions from other public institutions. The system is similar to 
a certain extent to the currency board arrangement, but it has greater flexibility within the 
given variation margins as the monetary authority can actually change them and it offers 
more freedom for exercising the monetary policy.  
3. Pegged exchange rates within fluctuation bands. This category includes those 
countries that joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM II (Slovenia – June 2004, 
Cyprus – May 2005) or adopted an independent system based upon similar principles 
(Hungary). A characteristic of this arrangement is the fact that the rate of exchange is 
maintained within certain fluctuation margins (±15%) around a central rate, with reference 
made to the euro.  
4. Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate. In this 
case, the monetary authority attempts to influence the exchange rate without having a 
specific exchange rate path or target. Indicators for managing the rate are broadly 
judgmental (e.g., balance of payments position, international reserves, parallel market 
developments), and adjustments are not to be automatic. Intervention may be direct or 
indirect. Countries in this group do not use as an anchor the exchange rate with reference 
to another currency or composite currency, but they are grouped according to their 
monetary policy strategy, based upon a direct aim at inflation – the Czech Republic and 
Romania.  
5. Free floating. In countries that have adopted this arrangement type, the exchange 
rate is market-determined, with any official foreign exchange market intervention aimed at 
moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate 
(Poland).  
Although in the description of exchange rate arrangements, we use phrases such 
as “fixed exchange rate” or “fixed parity” they are essentially based on the evolution of the 
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exchange rate on the market, and assessment is in fact a comparison to another 
exchange rate or currency at another given moment.  
 New member states have participated in the Economic and Monetary Union since 
accession, but they could not adopt the euro instantly because of the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty that require an evaluation of their potential to maintain their financial 
position and participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM II for at least two years 
after accession. When a country meets the convergence criteria it can adopt the euro and 
the central bank becomes part of the Eurosystem.   
Since June 28, 2004, Slovenia, Estonia and Lithuania – the last two without 
modifying their exchange rate arrangements of the currency board type – participate in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism – ERM II with fluctuation margins of ±15%, their domestic 
currencies being pegged to the euro through a fixed ratio of 239.640 Slovenian tolars 
(SIT), 15.6466 Estonian crowns (EEK) and 3.45280 Lithuanian litas (LTL). From January 
2007, Slovenia joined the Eurozone.   
Since May 2, 2005 Latvia, Cyprus and Malta – by setting fix exchange rates vis-à-
vis the euro to 0.702804 Latvian lats (LVL), 0.585274 Cyprus liras (CYP) and 0.429300 
Maltese liras – and since November 28, 2005 Slovakia, too, the Slovakian crown being 
pegged to the euro at a fixed rate of 1 EUR = 38.4550 SKK.  
Choosing robust monetary policy frameworks is also critical (Schadler, S., 
Drummond, P., Kuijs, L., Murgasova, Z., Van Elkan, R., 2004). Until entry into ERM II, 
existing frameworks - in most cases, inflation targeting with flexible exchange rates – 
continued. After ERM II entry, frameworks need to be adapted to enhance the stabilizing 
effects of the central parity, maximize the chances of meeting the exchange rate stability 
and inflation criteria, and manage risks of capital flow volatility. 
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